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1
Those of us who make a living by parading the troubles
caused by promises before first-year law students cannot have
ignored the unrest in recent years respecting the course in contracts. 1 For at least a decade we have been told first by one and
then by another of our company that the dear friend we know
as traditional contract law has fallen on hard times. The gist of
the various claims is that the world has passed us by. It is said
that what goes on in the law schools is no longer relevant to
current problems of law and life, and that our generalized
theory of contract has lost the bulk of its terrain-and thus its
vitality-to the forces of legislation and other specialized, selfcontained bodies of law. In short, we are asked to believe that
the fundamental concepts of traditional contract
law are obsolete
2
and therefore unworthy of systematic study.
In authoring a new casebook entitled Contracts as Basic Commercial Law, Professor Curtis Reitz declares himself with those
who call for reform in the teaching of contract law.3 Yet any
t Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
I Of course the principal target of criticism has been legal education in general. For
one of the more radical bills of indictment, see Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal
Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444 (1970).
2 For the flavor of the criticism, see L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA
vii-ix, 10, 25, 211-15 (1965); Black, Some Notes on Law Schools in the Present Day, 79 YALE
L.J. 505, 507-09 (1970); Friedman & Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract Teaching: Past,
Present, and Future, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 805; Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. REV. 55 (1963); Macneil, Restatement (Second) of
Contracts and Presentiation,60 VA. L. REV. 589 (1974).
3 C. REITZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS AS BASIC COMMERICAL LAW Xi-Xii
(1975).
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association of Reitz with other currently active reformers-notably the empiricists and the behaviorists 4 -- is at most
coincidental. Apart from a shared belief in the disutility of doctrinal contract, Reitz appears to have few ties with any movement
aimed at salvaging contract through the amassing of data from
the field. His selection and use of teaching materials, particularly
his heavy reliance on the ordinary appellate opinion, reveals a
general lack of interest in turning to the social sciences in search
of an empirical basis for the contracts course. Instead, Reitz responds to the problem of relevance by attempting to relate contract to fundamental, no-nonsense commercial law. He invites a
return to the genuinely "commercial" transaction as the proper
subject of study. 5 This explains both the book's double title and
its underlying premise, namely, that what has gone wrong with
contract teaching is traceable to the separation of contract law
from commercial law. Professor Reitz would reform the contracts course by moving from the general to the specific, using
the law of sales to provide the dominant thread of organizational
content.
Ultimately the question posed by the Reitz materials comes
to this: What is the justification for adding yet another casebook
to a highly competitive field already crowded with strong books,
many of which are more nearly alike than they are different?6
Unless there is virtue in fungibility, the answer must be that
there is need for another choice. The alternative Reitz offers is
shaped by his overriding conviction that the content of
bargains-not the mysteries of the enforceable promise-should
provide the focus of the contracts course. The trouble with the
present state of taught law, he tells us, is that structuring study
along the lines of the life history of a contract-formation
through offer and acceptance, enforceability by virtue of consid4

E.g., Friedman & Macaulay, supra note 2, at 809-10, 812-21; Macneil, Whither
Contracts?, 21 J. LEGAL ED. 403 (1969); Whitford, Book Review, 57 CORNELL L. REV.
855 (1972). For contrasting views, see Fuller, Some Obser'ationson the Course in Contracts,
20 J. LEGAL ED. 482 (1968); Gilmore, The Storrs Lectures: The Age of Anxiety, 84 YALE L.J.
1022 (1975); Speidel, Contract Law: Some Reflections upon Commercial Context and the Judicial Process, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 822.
5 C. RErrz, supra note 3, at xi, xxiv-xxv.
6
j. DAWSON & W. HARVEY, CASES ON CONTRACTS AND CONTRACT RENIEDIES (2d ed.
1969); E. FARNSWORTH, W. YOUNG & H. JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS
(2d ed. 1972); L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW (3d ed. 1972); J.
JACKSON, CONTRACT LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1973); F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE,
CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1970); I. MACNEIL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONTRACTS (1971); A. MUELLER & A. RosETT, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION
(1971); E. MURPHY & R. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW (1970);J. MURRAY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS (1969).
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eration or a substitute, performance and nonperformance in accordance with the law of conditions, breach, and remedies-"puts doctrine ahead of context."7 As a result, the "real"
problems in contract-problems of the meaning of agreements,
and of defining the scope of obligation in applying a
contract-are preempted by excursions into borderline areas
that contain a low yield of currently significant issues.
For Reitz, then, the beginnings of a different path lie in the
removal of exercises in doctrinal frolic and detour. His decision
to part company with much of the common law learning cannot
be explained as a grudging concession to requirements of space
or time or the like. Rather, Contracts as Basic Commercial Law is
born out of a fundamental breach with the traditional content
and structure of contract studyAs
In fairness to Professor Reitz, I must make a brief disclosure. This reviewer has grown weary of much of the talk about
the deficiencies of contract law and teaching, especially that
which proceeds on the assumption that the thing we presently
palm off in the classroom is some spruced-up, rearranged
version-in content and in spirit-of what occupied the minds of
Langdell and Williston. As long as the baseline for attack is a
model constructed out of late nineteenth-century orthodoxy,
contract can always be made to appear out of fashion. The Willistonian conception of contract-the so-called unitary or "classical" theory that infects the first Restatement9 and about which
Grant Gilmore has written so splendidly in recent timest°'-is
indeed dead. But in fact it never lived save as an illusion, and
then only in scattered quarters and surely not in the cases.
My point is mainly that the classical theory is too simple a
target (witness the fact that the mailbox rule is usually the first
thing wheeled out to document assertions of contract
irrelevance).1 1 Perhaps the greatest hazard in taking the idea of a
unitary theory of contract seriously is that one comes eventually
REITZ, supra note 3, at xxiii.
Id. xxiii-xxviii.

7C.

8

(1932).
"'The essential features of the classical theory were a limited range of liability

9 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

under consideration theory, a notion of strict liability within those limits, and a restrictive approach toward damage awards. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 3-53
(1974); Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 1161 (1975).
"E.g., Friedman & Macaulay, supra note 2, at 812. At least one scholar has found
intellectual rewards in studying contracts formed through correspondence. Sharp,
Reflections on Contract, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 212-15 (1966).
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to conclude that a body of law organized around doctrinally
oriented subject matter cannot possibly provide a theoretical
basis for the present day. If by the term "doctrine" we mean a
principle of law established through past decisions, then doctrine
is at home in contract. But doctrine, like most other things, is a
matter of more or less, of emphasis-as has always been clear
from a reading of the stories in the contract reports. It is one
thing to reject doctrinal orthodoxy, and to work at releasing the
grip of black letter formulation on organization and theoretical
structure. It is something else to cut off the underpinnings of
structure by driving doctrinal concepts from classroom discussions of contract disputes. Judging from the advance sheets and
the casebook marketplace, there is as yet scant evidence that
salvation for the contracts course lies in some form of
antidoctrine. 12 The disclosure, then, is that I enter upon this task
believing that measured quantities of the older learning are essential to the basic course in contract. Moreover, the arrival of
each new set of teaching materials confirms my suspicion that it
is considerably easier to talk about reform in contract study than
it is to carry it out.

II
Rather than unpack the Reitz book in detail, or quarrel
about preferences in areas where the play of discretion is inevitable, I wish to focus on organizational principles and general
themes.13 The first distinguishing feature of the book is a structure resting on a different view of the direction of march
through the subject matter of contract. The author reverses the
usual birth-to-death order of presentation of concepts, substituting a format designed to emphasize the extent of performance
before breach and litigation. A second feature surely to be
noticed is the omission of transactions located at the margins of
12 Gilmore, FriedrichKessler, 84 YALE L. J. 672, 681 (1975). See generally Jones, The
Jurisprudence of Contracts, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 43 (1975).
13On another occasion Professor Reitz has expressed the view that "[a] book review
is not the medium for declaring what a different book the reviewer would have written." Reitz, Book Review, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 697, 699 (1975). I must respectfully dissent, especially when the book in question is a set of teaching materials that purports to
depart from established patterns with an innovative approach. In light of his broadside
attack on the study of traditional contract, it seems appropriate that Professor Reitz
assume the burden of demonstrating that he has found a better way. My reading of the
academic marketplace tells me that that burden is a heavy one. Thus, a reviewer of any
new entrant is obliged to confront the ultimate question of what the basic contracts
course should be about.
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commerce, a reform carrying with it the elimination of many
problems at the core of orthodox contract.
Reitz tells us that one of the great failings of traditional
contract is that "it deemphasizes the necessary fact that a court
always sees a contract controversy by looking backward from the
phase of disagreement."1 4 From this, he concludes that the legal
system fails to take sufficient account of the "performance
phase" of the transaction in litigation.1 5 The rascal is, of course,
the unitary theory. Given the inclination of that theory to seek
out the enforceable promise, Reitz would have us believe that
courts are too often drawn off into doctrinal debates about contract formation and fail to see the significance of performances
already rendered by the parties. 16 Furthermore, the quality of
judicial performance suffers because traditional doctrines focus
on the words used in a transaction when, in fact, it is the examination of the context of the transaction that is "the most im17
portant dimension to understanding the parties' agreement."
Having perceived the problem as basically one of a doctrinal
structure unsuited to the task of determining what contracts
mean in application, the author aims ultimately to achieve a
greater understanding of what courts do in fact with disputed
bargains.
His plan is to highlight transactional context by emphasizing
the performance stage of contract. What results is more in the
nature of a structural overhaul of the classic casebook than it is a
blueprint of a new world. Because disputes over the meaning of
contracts are litigated today with great frequency, Reitz purports
to make up the bulk of the contracts course with cases exposing
judicial techniques for defining the obligation created by a
contract.1 8 The book opens with various aspects of the process of
interpreting and applying contracts 19-subjects appearing near
the mid-point of most contracts courses. Reitz follows this innovation with an order of presentation based on the extent to
which performance has taken place prior to disruption of the
14 C. RErrz, supra note 3, at xxiii.
ISId. xxiv.
16 I believe that the case law does not support Professor Reitz's

claim that
"[v]irtually none of the traditional law of contracts takes cognizance of the performance
phase at the point of litigation." Id.
17 Id.
ISd. xii.

9
1d. 1-154. Others have noted that questions of interpretation arise in a very large
number of contracts decisions. E.g., Shepherd, Contracts in a Prosperity Year, 6 STAN. L.
REv. 208, 223, 226 (1954).
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relationship. Lawsuits arising out of wholly executed bargains
are collected in Part II,2" disputes occurring at some point short
of plaintiff's full performance are the subject of Part JIJ,21 and
Part IV, with a noticeable lack of enthusiasm, looks at claims
arising under a wholly executory bargain and claims based on
the bargaining process.2 2 Thus the materials on mutual assent
and consideration are relegated to the end of the book and
treated only in bare outline. Presumably the objective in displacing the standard front end of the contracts course is to deemphasize doctrine, thereby advancing the author's concern to
focus attention on the content and context of bargains.
In addition to trimming assent and consideration materials
and positioning the survivors late in the book, Reitz seeks to
accomplish still further doctrinal deemphasis by omitting entirely the familiar cases based on noncommercial promises-for
example, KirkseV v. KirkseV23 and Hamer v. Sidzvy. 24 No doubt it
will come as a surprise to many to learn that such promises are
not "central to the idea of contract as a mechanism for
exchange. '"25 Nevertheless, this kind of change reflects the
author's general approach to the enforceable promise. He believes that classic theory lost touch with reality not only because
of its unitary quality, but also because the theory itself was
"shaped by noncommercial transactions, or more accurately by
noncommercial attitudes toward all transactions." 6 In sum,
Reitz's argument with traditional contract is that its preoccupation with problems arising at the periphery of exchange means
that the business of marking off the enforceable promise consumes far too much attention at the expense of more important
and active issues. His solution is to remove from view materials
that litigate the question of existence of liability, and to replace
them with materials that litigate the nature and extent of
liability.2 7
C. REITZ, supra note 3, at 155-308.
Id. 309-560. If there is a casebook area in need of skillful editing and presentation, it is the subject matter of performance and nonperformance. Reitz attacks the
problem with an arrangement based on the causes of bargain disruption, relying on a
reduction in principal cases and an expansion of text to bring about a simpler, more
orderly
exposition.
22
1d. 561-665.
21 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
24 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891).
25 C. REn'z, supra note 3, at xxv.
26 Reitz, supra note 13, at 699.
27 Instead of devoting great attention to the question: was there a contract, we
will deal with the question: what did the contract require or permit the parties
20

21

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 124:1466

III
The declared purpose of the book is "to provide a teaching
tool for a first-year law course.

' 28

It may well do that, and do it

effectively. My concern, however, is whether the bbok can serve
as a vehicle for a meaningful course in contracts-that fundamental sub-division of the law which has come to occupy a critical position in the early stages of law study. Although the book is
an original product of a first-rate mind, I have difficulty with
both its message and its manner of delivery.
It will be observed that the book is entitled Contracts as Basic
Commercial Law, not Basic Contracts as Commercial Law. This difference is reflected not only in the book's substantive content,
but in its pedagogical method as well. There is no effort at the
outset to introduce contract as an institution, or to suggest the
scope or sources of contract law. Specially written text generally
ignores the legal history of enforcement of promises and background developments leading up to the modern cases. 29 The
author goes immediately to a pattern of principal cases-many
of which are of recent vintage and not found in traditional
books-followed by questions,3 " an occasional original problem,
and numerous blocks of text material.3 1 It is clear that Reitz has
in mind a study of the disposition of business disputes in court,
not the conventional development of a generalized conception of
to do. We will be exploring the landscape of the territory of contractual
agreements rather than charting the outer edges or boundary lines that mark
the separation of the land of contract from the land of no-contract.
C. RETZ,
supra note 3, at xxiii.
28
d. xi.
29See, e.g., id. 81-82, 177-78, 306-08, 310-i1, 339-41, 582-85, 602-07.
a"See, e.g., id. 367-68. Many of these questions are excess baggage; they are already
implicit in the selection and arrangement of the cases. To the extent that post-case
questions go beyond the cases, there is a risk that they will springboard the user of the
book into lines of inquiry the profitability of which reasonable people may fairly debate.
This is especially unsettling where, as in the Reitz book, subject matter limitations already lock student and teacher into a particularized view of contract. Rather than supporting discussion of the major problems and distinctions contained in the cases, Reitz's
excessive use of questions and note commentary at times tends to channel attention to
the whole of "the law" in a particular problem area. Moreover, many of the strengths of
the book, such as its emphasis on the procedural posture of issues reaching the appellate level, are dissipated by these strings of questions.
I See, e.g., id. 90- 111, 155-97. Reitz's original text-especially that which introduces
a new block of material-is successful at keeping matters currently under consideration
within the larger perspective of his performance arrangement. See, e.g., id. 309, 328,
344, 375-76, 408-09, 430-32. As to case selection, many of the familiar favorites are
omitted; absent a test in the classroom, it is difficult to determine whether the replacements are good teaching cases.
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contract law and theory. The title is not misleading-this is not a
book about basic contract.
Given Reitz's criticisms of the way the traditional contracts
course is taught, one might reasonably have expected to see a
different book. The author's case for change rests principally on
antidoctrinal grounds, yet the book addresses many of the familiar doctrinal problems in an unexceptional manner. One need
look no further than Part I-on interpretation, the parol evidence rule, and the statute of frauds-to see very conventional
treatment of major doctrinal areas.3 2 Although Reitz takes great
pains in Parts II and III to present problems grouped according
to the extent of performance, his materials proceed in a fashion
commonly found in the performance sections of conventional
casebooks. Indeed, some blocks of material are merely reproductions of the standard fare. 33 Apart from the innovations represented by the opening and closing sections, it is not apparent
that this book does the customary things any differently from
others already in print.
The "different orientation" 34 Reitz offers is based on selection and arrangement of materials already in the casebook field.
His thesis is that a better way of teaching and of handling contract problems can be achieved by more efficient presentation.
So he culls out problems thought to be insignificant, and he
declares an intention to move away from the abstractions of general contract theory to a study of the common types of commercial exchange. 35 Yet his principles and themes are not readily
identified at work in the book. For example, his "strong thread
of cases and problems deriving from contracts for the sale of
goods" 36 never quite develops-at least as a "thread." The book
does not provide in-depth coverage of sales law such as to render
unnecessary an upper level offering in Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Nor does the book systematically use the
Code-by analogy or otherwise-to illustrate statutory and
common law relationships, or as a source of exercises in statutory
methodology.3 7 Code materials are treated mostly by way of informational text, and seldom in a problem format.3 8 Despite the
"2 See id. 90-154.
aaE.g., id. 227-48, 383-401.
' 4 Id. xxiii.
31 The book includes an index of contracts according to business context. Id.
751-52.
a6 Id. xxiv.
37 See, e.g., id. 146-54.
a See, e.g., id. 198-204, 354-58, 375-77, 400-01, 412-13, 582-85.
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claim to relate the Code to the subject matter of contract, there
does not seem to be any greater Code integration than is found
in other books that include the usual core of contract law.3 9
The presentation of sale of goods materials is representative
of the treatment accorded the various transactions found in the
book. Reitz ranks exposure to diverse business contexts high in
importance. 41' But the transactional mix is not translated into
recurring themes about the legal implications of general theories
and differing settings. In view of his emphasis on context and his
asserted preference for sale of goods cases, one would expect to
see a contextual approach organized around transaction types.
This is of course an accepted casebook technique for relieving
the strain on general theory occasioned by the business needs of
specialized areas of activity. 4 1 Yet there is no sustained effort to
isolate factual settings for comparison purposes, no organizing
principle that tracks the passage of doctrinal concepts from
transaction to transaction.
The beginnings of an explanation of this seeming disparity
between goal and achievement lie in the narrow range of materials contained in the book. Although Reitz condemns judicially
administered concepts for obscuring contract in context, his efforts to fix attention on the content of bargains are based almost
exclusively on the use of the ordinary appellate opinion. 42 Rarely
does he flesh out his presentation with non-case materials-original text or extracts from secondary sources-pointing
to the business background of a case or the social and economic
significance of the underlying transaction. This failure to
broaden and enrich discussion of the cases is perplexing in light
of his recurring claim that doctrinal contract operates to conceal
the importance of underlying transactions.
Many of the points Reitz wishes to make about the content
and context of promise-making are not easily made within the
confines of the appellate opinion. 43 We are indeed aware that
parsing an appellate opinion involves an awkward search backward through a trial record which itself conceals business facts
39 In fact the book adheres closely to a common law orientation, as is made clear in
the author's
suggestions to students for contract study. Id. xxviil-xxx.
40
Id. xxiv. Surprisingly, the book does not provide distinct treatment of consumer
contracts.
41

See, e.g., A. MUELLER & A. RosErr, supra note 6.
42 There is reason to believe that Reitz's argument with traditional contract has less

to do with legal structure than with the limitations of the appellate opinion as a vehicle
for presenting business facts.
13 Nor are they easily made within the covers of a single book purporting to supply
a basic course in contract. See generally Whitford, supra note 4.
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and situation-sense. Still, a contract is "a promise . . . for the
breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty. '4 4 In determining those rights and duties, the courts apply a developing body
of doctrines derived from precedents, rules, statutes, and restatements. The ordinary contract opinion today is a story about
what is happening to those doctrines. To teach through cases is
to teach that story in a setting marked by incomplete knowledge
of specific facts and general business background. Thus, the case
method seems ill-suited to Reitz's preference for context over
doctrine.
IV
The most troubling aspect of the book is its downgrading of
materials critical to the development of insight into basic theory
and decisional processes, and to the accomplishment of the customary goals of a first-year course. I speak of concepts commonly associated with the enforceable promise.
That each beginning law course carries a designated title
confirms the existence of an established body of learning, organized and subdivided into fields. In presenting one of these
fields to students we are space-bound by received classifications;
there is a language to be learned and a culture to be passed on.
And because our task is to prepare lawyers who will advise and"
represent clients and persuade decisionmakers, there is an intellectual discipline that is central to the common enterprise. A
casebook must operate within the familiar limitations of subject matter and the problem or case method of instruction.
The analytic goals we value so highly cannot be achieved if the
classroom process of analyzing and distinguishing cases is conducted as a freestanding exercise in its own right, for its own
sake. To be meaningful, analysis must have a substantive base in
materials that contain lines of development, groupings of connected problems arranged in a sequence. In short, we are after
the skill of synthesis. Unless the student is obliged to reassemble
the components taken from a series of related problems he is not
really forced to think about the unsolved problem.
I find the book thin on materials for developing the reinforcing skills of analysis and synthesis. 45 In part, this is because
§ I (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
4 Some subjects are presented with little more than a descriptive sketch. See, e.g.,
C. REITZ, supra note 3, at 339-43 (condition and promise); 430-53 (disruption caused by
change of circumstances); 602-07 (consideration).
4RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
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the book is shorter than most, with fewer principal cases and
therefore only an occasional line of cases that deals at length
with any substantive area. 46 The usual tension between coverage
and depth is balanced to favor coverage, which is achieved by
incorporating numerous informational notes. What emerges is a
book giving the appearance of covering a little about a variety of
contractual transactions. The opening sections of the book-on
the elusive subjects of interpretation, unconscionability, and obligations of good faith-reflect what in my judgment is its shortcoming throughout: In an effort to modernize contract through
illustrative glimpses of relatively recent developments, the editor
has removed the staples for conveying important themes about
the nature of contract.
This is why the book's initial sections are a risky experiment
in entry into contract study, and why, ultimately, the general
scheme of organization may prove not to have the virtues
claimed. Because the course does not open with typical doctrinal
themes, the student is ill-equipped to handle the unusually complex doctrinal problems that arise in Parts I and II. For example,
only the most courageous among us would take up the concept
of mutual assent with the classic "chicken" case on the first day
of class. 47 While it is customary to introduce the Uniform Com-

mercial Code with a section 2-207 exercise in "the battle of the
forms," to be meaningful the exercise requires at least a first
acquaintance with common law notions of the deviant acceptance; and if there is to be an exercise at all, the student should
have access to more than the single opinion in Doughboy
Industries.48 Relief for mistake is confusing enough in its own
right. To introduce it with cases involving avoidance of personal
injury releases 49 forces the student to confront adhesion settings
with little idea of the law's customary supervision of the bargaining process. The course moves quickly to the duty of good faith
as found in standardized contract and unconscionability
46 The book contains about 90 principal cases, less than half the number found in
other contracts casebooks. E.g., L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, supra note 6. I suspect that
the book is designed for a four-unit course to be offered in a single semester, and that
it is intended to serve as a direct lead-in to upper class offerings in the commercial
field.
47 Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) (Friendly, J.).
48 Application of Doughboy Industries, Inc., 17 App. Div. 2d 216, 233 N.Y.S.2d
488 (1962).
49 Cady v. Mitchell, 208 Pa. Super. 16, 220 A.2d 373 (1966); Boccarossa v. Watkins,
112 R.I. 551, 313 A.2d 135 (1973); C. REITZ, supra note 3, at 55-64.
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settings, 51' addressing the problem of unfair pressure without
exposing the student to its doctrinal antecedents, not the least of
which is the requirement of consideration. Surely the invalidating doctrines traditionally used to police the bargain-fraud,
duress, mistake, and so forth-need to be worked through before examining recent intrusions into the substance of the bargain.
Reitz's purpose in positioning these subjects is to illustrate
techniques of interpretation, not to teach substance. Still, it is
hard to see how understanding of the multi-layered concept of
"meaning" in contract is advanced without some working notion
of how an agreement gets to be a contract at all, and what different things can happen to the parties when we "enforce" a contract. We need to know what it is we are filling and shaping-and
the legal consequences of what we do-before we can profit
from observing how it is done. 5 ' To take an example from Reitz's
second section, 52 the emerging duty of good faith has ancestral
roots in the long-standing confusion between terms implied in
fact and terms imposed in law. If we are to talk intelligently
about current obligations derived from good faith doctrines, the
idea of tacit agreement-indeed, the entire institution of implied
contract-must be brought along with some care and molded
into the structure of contract in general.
Synthesis inevitably includes an historical dimension. In law,
as in life, we only really understand where we are by taking
account of how we arrived here, No doubt there exists fresh
contract material which, viewed pedagogically, does not require
the support of the past. But as an organizational scheme for
contract teaching, movement from the older materials to current
formulations and emerging trends seems so obviously sensible as
not to require serious discussion. Competing legal solutions, case
50

d. 66-85.

51The problem of difference in meaning is pervasive in our law. It arises in determining whether there is a contract and in defining rights and duties under a contract.
The Reitz book purports to exclude disputes over the existence of a contract, concentrating on disputes about terms. Even assuming these two areas of interpretation can be
neatly separated, his approach is surely not the way to introduce doctrines for determining whose meaning prevails in cases of divergent understanding. The lines along
which tests of reasonable use of language have developed in law need to be tracked in a

more orderly sequence. The problem of interpretation is too central to all of contract
and dependent on too many distinct compartments of the law to be inserted at the
beginning of a contracts course, before operative meaning is introduced in the formation stage.
52 C. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 66-85. A further example is the author's treating the
law of warranty and products liability before the conceptual problems of promise, representation, and fraud. Id. 155-97.
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or statutory, are to be found in the doctrinally different answers
given to the same or similar questions over a span of time.5 3
The shortcomings of the Reitz book derive from a failure to
address-selectively, systematically, and very promptly-the
assent and consideration concepts that make up the enforceable
promise. The case for continuing to treat these concepts in
measured classroom doses 5 4 rests initially on a recognition that
ideas central to contract, and traveling under a variety of labels,
are found in doctrinal problems clustered about the enforceable
promise. Furthermore, portions of the received wisdom are ideally suited to exercises in synthesis. Such doctrines as "mutuality
of obligation" and "pre-existing duty" are properly discredited
and perhaps in some senses even dead, but the problems of the
highly conditioned bargain and the pressured adjustment in
mid-course are undeniably alive. We ignore reality if we assume
that dispositions either in court or in the law office are unaf55
fected by any thought of consideration teachings.
A principal justification for attending to the enforceable
promise rests on the plain fact that dramatic shifts have occurred
in our attitudes about the range of enforceable promises. To
cite but one line of development, the general tendency toward
moving the point of liability to an earlier stage of the
transaction-even into the bargaining process-is merely a reflection of a series of lesser, interconnected doctrinal adjustments. 56 Identification of the enforceable promise is no
53 Law study, of course, concerns the use of decided cases to work out sensible
solutions for undecided cases. The most productive subjects for synthesis are those in
which basic policy assumptions achieved legal status at an early point, after which attention shifted to problems of rationalization and articulation within the confines of judicial opinions in individual cases.
14 Perhaps the most frustrating question today is how to abridge treatment of the
conventional front-end of contract-that is, formation and consideration-and yet retain its essence in ways that respond to contemporary commercial activity. In my judgment it is done through definitive text, prudent case selection, and, in general, through
consolidation and integration of doctrinal themes. For example, standard acceptance
doctrines can be meshed with recent advances of the reliance principle in connection
with offers, a setting that lends itself to consideration of the role of commercial usage
and the techniques of interpretation and implication. See, e.g., Janke Constr. Co. v.
Vulcan Materials Co., 386 F. Supp. 687 (W.D. Wis. 1974); Savoca Masonry Co. v.
Homes & Son Constr. Co., 542 P.2d 817 (Ariz. 1975); Constructors Supply Co. v. Bostrom Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 291 Minn. 113, 190 N.W.2d 71 (1971).
5 See, e.g., Rosellini v. Banchero, 83 Wash. 2d 268, 517 P.2d 955 (1974).
See generally Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78
YALE L.J. 343 (1969); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUMi. L. REv. 629 (1943); Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44
N.Y.U.L. REv. 673 (1969); Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968).
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longer an exercise limited to a matching up of offer and acceptance and the application of a strict test of bargain. This is not
the place to elaborate the new concept of assent that is in the process of formulation, or to track the ever-increasing encroachment of reliance and enrichment ideas upon basic theories of
liability. 57 What needs to be said is that many of the striking developments in contract are occurring in areas heavily burdened
with history. To remove the underpinnings of these developments is to deprive the student of insight that comes with discovery. I am not talking about inquests for dead problems. The
field of contract formation is relevant today because it is at the
intersection of many of the movements that are responsible for
the expansion of liability we are currently witnessing.
An obvious reason for including materials that facilitate
historical synthesis is the importance of drawing attention to the
element of change or creativity that marks our legal system.
Much of the value of the first semester of legal education comes
from seeing the courts feeling their way. That is why the story of
promissory estoppel, which Reitz virtually ignores, is so wellsuited to telling in a contracts class. An accurate picture of
contract in action requires that fundamental distinctions and
classifications be introduced early and returned to again and
again.
Contract involves really two sets of working notions: One is
a notion of harm, or a wrong; the other is a notion of remedy. I
am at a loss to understand how the details of today's contract law
can be put in manageable form without talking repeatedly about
expectancy, reliance, and restitution as bases of liability and
protectable interests. It is through these distinctions that controlling notions of contract policy are expressed. They are indispensable building blocks as well as ideal material for the "process" or "technique" emphasis that occurs early in any first-year
course. The student needs to be made to see that quite different
kinds of harm result from the making of contracts, and that the
law has devised alternative avenues of approach to a single
problem. This cannot be done successfully with fragmented collections of cases and an occasional descriptive note. 58 Teaching

'7

See generally Braucher, Freedom of Contract and the Second Restatement, 78 YALE L.J.
598 (1969); Childres & Garamella, The Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in
Contract, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 433 (1969); Henderson, Promises Grounded in the Past: The
Idea of Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Contracts, 57 VA. L. REv. 1115 (1971).
58
E.g., C. REITZ, supra note 3, at 220-27, 602-07, 628-45.
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materials need to be arranged so as to play on basic and recurrent themes.
In bypassing materials on this century's refinement of concepts of promise and bargain, Reitz sacrifices subject matter that
has great utility in the study of contract remedies. Perhaps the
single most compelling justification for continuing to study the
enforceable promise is its close proximity to the field of contract
remedies, the premier subject matter of a contracts course. A
great many problems in contract-especially problems arising in
the formation area-are looked at from the perspective of taking
care of losses. Cases involving indefinite contracts and the endless forms of partial agreement5 9 come quickly to mind as instances of the remedial orientation of offer and acceptance doctrines, wholly apart from the salvage function performed by the
restitution idea. The prevailing "objective theory" of promissory
liability serves to restore positions worsened by the inevitable
risks of language and proof of harm. 6" The history of the unilateral contract, the firm offer principle, and the many antiforfeiture doctrines (for example, estoppel, the implied
term)-to say nothing of the interplay of tort and contract that
characterizes the section 9061 explosion-are strong evidence of
the enforceable promise's continuing significance for the fashioning of contract remedies.
The central idea of vindication of expectancies needs to be
considered in many different forms before it truly becomes a
part of the student's understanding. That is why remedial principles are best introduced at the beginning of a casebook, in
connection with the search for the enforceable promise. The
underlying purposes of contract law are revealed most clearly
when reimbursement of reliance and prevention of unjust enrichment are made themes in competition with protection of the
expectancy. Quite often this can be done with a simple transaction. When the hand has even less utility after the operation than
before, the boy is worse off in a sense that is different from not
being as well off as the physican's assurances had led him to
62
expect.
My remarks to this point should have made clear my view
that Reitz's total exclusion of the so-called noncommercial
19 See Henderson, supra note 57, at 1141-45.
60 See, e.g., Sharp, Mr. Justice Holmes: Contracts, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 270-77
(1964).
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).

62Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929). See also Sullivan v.
O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973).
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contracts-the bargain within the family and the promise
prompted by mixed motives of exchange and gift-is a costly

mistake. Cases of this nature continue to overrun the reports,
and the problems they raise serve a variety of purposes in a
contracts course. Among the lessons to be taken from the noncommercial transaction is that contract is often called upon to
resolve a broad spectrum of problems that are essentially noncontractual, and that place enormous stress upon our system of
contract remedies. Contract is as much a social and economic
concept as it is a set of rights and duties.6 3 In order to understand the element of exchange which informs all of contract
through the bargain theory of consideration, it is necessary to
explore the various species of exchange found in social and business relations. It is the study of borderline areas, where motives
differ from the usual commercial ones, that truly brings home to
the student the significance of economic exchange in law and in
the practical affairs of the community. Furthermore, development of the idea of freedom of contract begins with the set of
policies underlying the law's treatment of promises on the
periphery of commerce. It would be difficult to overstate the
extent to which the family transaction and the informal gratuitous promise have shaped doctrines that infect the entire life
cycle of a contract.
V
A contract casebook must aim at more than the acquisition
of substantive knowledge and analytic skills. It must constitute a
self-contained intellectual product which conveys some larger
notion of contract as a device for social and economic ordering.
If a message of this sort comes through at all, it is usually to be
found, quietly and implicitly, in the selection and arrangement
of the cases and supporting notes and problems. Looking to theentire group of contract casebooks, one might safely conclude
that it is not easy to construct an identifiable theoretical structure
from materials that depart widely from the common core of
traditional contract. 6 4 There are reasons this should be so. We
are, after all, talking about the basic course in contract; the bulletin can be consulted for listings of courses available next year and
63 We are indebted to Professor Harry Jones for his recent reminder that we lose
sight of the social role of contract when we remove the modest transactions of ordinary
people from the casebooks. See Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence, 74 COLUM. L. REv.
1023, 1027-28 (1974).
64 At least one book has made the break convincingly. I. MACNEIL, supra note 6.
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the year following in specialized types of contracts. Given the
vastness and essential untidiness of contract and the limited time
within which we work, the message most likely to get across will
be about basic theory. Judging from the talk in law school halls,
the specialized message of the upper level offerings is already
receiving a less than enthusiastic reception.
As a casebook moves away from traditional subject matter in
pursuit of recent specialties, there is less opportunity to explore
values much cherished in our society. I refer to the many spinoffs from the familiar theme of tension between freedom of
contract and governmental regulation. If emerging trends are to
be put in proper perspective (which is to say understood), students need to have some rough notion of how we came to embrace, and deal with in law, the interests reflected in such terms
as "freedom of contract" and "the security of expectations." It is
not necessary that a casebook incorporate decisions that illustrate
step-by-step historical development; in fact, textual treatment is
preferable in most instances. But there are areas that must be
included in some form if we are to get a sense of how the ideas
at the bottom of contract-the notion of the return of a thing or
its equivalent, the notion of form, the notion of wrong or
harm -- came to be worked out in our law. For the most part,
these are materials out of which emerged legal recognition of the
enforceable promise.
Rightly or wrongly, most teachers of contract are committed
to traditional books. To attract followers, a casebook must be
anchored in basic theory while incorporating materials looking
to a more specialized conception of contract. The failure to provide this anchor is, I believe, the crucial problem with Professor
Reitz's book.
" See generally Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An HistoricalIntroduction to Contract,
69 COLuM. L. REv. 576 (1969).

